

then have the subsequent opportunity to override that veto by a three-fifths majority of all of the members elected to the General Assembly.

This is the kind of recommendation which has been made countless times by students of state government and students of budgetary process, that the General Assembly should be free to increase or decrease within the balanced budget, but that this should in turn be checked and balanced by a governor with the power to reduce or strike out such an item.

What we have in Maryland is the British system of budgeting without the advantages thereof. In Britain the government falls if the budget is increased. We do not have such a situation in this country, and there the government, of course, is a part of the Parliament itself.

In this country, in a system of divided powers, we have the process in many states which I am discussing and describing here this afternoon. The problem, then, is to permit the legislature to participate fully in the establishment of the priorities of the State, to achieve the objectives that were suggested by the Goodnow Commission in 1916 to give the governor the executive budget and the sole responsibility to submit that budget to the legislature; that the legislature, in the second principle of that report, should not change the budget so as to incur a deficit; that the legislature may provide for programs not included in the governor's estimate. This in the Goodnow Report was proposed to be done in two ways, either by the supplemental appropriation which was adopted in 1916 or by an increase voted by three-fifths of the members of the General Assembly, and providing the revenues in the act for the new appropriation.

I submit that we can achieve these same objectives in the framework of 1967 and beyond that date rather than in the framework of 1916 up to the present date. I urge you to support this amendment, because I believe that we have created in this State now by the actions of this Committee a very strong governor who does not have the check within the administration of the comptroller, who has full power to make the estimate of revenues, who has full powers to establish the executive budget, and who will have in addition to this full power under the new executive article to exercise firm and strong administrative and budgetary discipline over his department heads.

This is a powerful officer, and we need to provide a suitable legislative check to that officer.

THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow.

DELEGATE SHERBOW: Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, I do not know of any matter that is going to come before you or that has come before you that is as important as that which faces you now. I urge you to turn down this amendment. This amendment would literally destroy the budget system as we know it in Maryland, and as it has worked for a half-century, giving us sound government.

I am rather intrigued at the fact that this amendment is presented at this time in this fashion. There were no persons, committees, or recommendations appearing before our Committee urging what is called for in this amendment except the two or three members of the Committee who were from the legislature who discussed it.

We have had nothing in public hearings urging that we strike the guts out of the system we now have and put in its place what would be the greatest opportunity for log-rolling in the General Assembly that man could conceive.

Let me tell you how this operates. The budget is a long, detailed document submitted by the governor. When the budget is passed, it is in and of itself a law. If another law is being considered, you get an opportunity to be heard. If it passes and goes into the other house, you know it is that particular law. You know that this is the bill that you want to follow, either to pass or to keep from passing.

But what is going to happen when there is presented not what the governor recommends, but an item to change — let me pick this one out: all of the appropriations for the University of Maryland — and turn them over to the five colleges; or take the reverse, taking everything out of the five colleges and giving that to the University of Maryland.

You may or may not be able to follow that kind of detail. This is the way in which you can destroy the whole system of government as it has been built up. The legislature has tremendous power. We have had a balanced budget. This kind of suggestion was made to the Sobeloff Commission. They listened. They said no.

The kind of recommendation for a budget system that we have in Maryland is the